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Abstract2  
This article examines continuity and change in the European Union’s interactions with the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with regard to Myanmar. As the EU has used its connections 
with ASEAN to raise its concerns around Myanmar, the Association’s behaviour also comes into focus. 
This investigation is linked to the evolution of the EU in world affairs via its political ties to ASEAN. It 
concentrates on the rather abrupt change introduced by the reform process launched in 2011-12, which 
marked the beginning of a new phase. The EU’s concern that the Myanmar issue not destabilise its 
relations with ASEAN has remained constant, however changes in the dialogue can be seen as forming 
three distinct phases. It is maintained that the aspiration to escape from pervasive China and the 
desirability of attracting new partners were the catalyst for these changes. Official documents from 
the EU, the European Commission, and European Council Conclusions and Common Positions, 
declarations issued at ASEAN, Asia-Europe and other meetings, together with secondary sources and 
interviews conducted mostly in Myanmar, contribute to this work. While many scholars have hinted at 
the extent to which the issue of Myanmar has been problematic to the EU-ASEAN links, there has been 
no emphasis on the positive effect that Myanmar has had on EU-ASEAN relations. This research 
illuminates the extent to which this issue has conversely helped to reinforce the long-lasting EU-
ASEAN relationship.   
 
Key words: European Union, EU-ASEAN, ASEM, Myanmar, foreign policy analysis     
 
Introduction  
 
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has recently generated increasing 
attention among scholars and observers alike.3 The 2011-12 reform process, 
the 2012 by-elections and the transfer of power to a civilian, military-
sponsored government marked abrupt changes. President Thein Sein (a 
former general, Prime Minister since 2007, and President since March 2011) 
appeares to be the architect of the transformation. The by-elections resulted in 
a landslide victory for the government’s opposition party, the National League 
for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel Peace laureate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Sein’s government released a number of political prisoners, concluded 
ceasefire arrangements with armed groups in the ethnic regions, signed peace 
agreements, made efforts to eliminate the use of forced labour, recognised 
labourers’ right to strike, and amended the censorship laws.4 In January 2013, 
                                                             
1 The shortened pen-name ‘Marchi’ is used in the text and references. 
2 A first version of this article was prepared for the 2013 EUSA AP Annual Conference, Macau, 17-18 
May, ‘Reassessing the EU-Asia Pacific Relationship in the context of the EU crisis.’ The author thanks 
the participants, John Leslie and Pascaline Winand, and also the participants in the discussion of this 
last version, in January 2014, at Singapore Management University, School of Social Science, in 
particular Paul Evans, Clara Portela and William Tov, and ANZJES’ anonymous reviewers for their 
constructive comments.     
3 For the country profile, see the EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013), pp. 5-46. 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/csp/07_13_en.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2013.  
4 Council conclusions, 3159th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxemburg, 23 April 2012. Censorship 
laws, however, still exist and are enacted; see: T. Myint-U, ‘Help Myanmar’s peace talks to transform 
Asia,’ Financial Times, 22 November 2013.  
an international conference was organized in Myanmar, at which the Sein 
government’s timetable for reform over the next three years was unveiled. Yet, 
the government is facing challenges including the need to reform the 
Constitution, which preserves the military’s supremacy over the Cabinet and 
Parliament5 as it places the National Defence and Security Council above the 
hluttaw, the Burmese Parliament, with 10 of its 11 members being officers or 
former officers.6 Sein’s restructuring has been unmatched by any previous 
government leadership since the coup d’état of 1962. The latter brought to 
power a military junta (under the official name of the State Peace and 
Development Council, SPDC, successively changed into the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council, SLORC, and again into the SPDC) which ruled the 
country until 2011. The SLORC/SPDC suppressed domestic dissent and 
exercised absolute power, despite 20 years of sanctions imposed by the EU 
and other international actors. The new developments have been 
acknowledged by the EU as ‘historic improvements,’7 and as ‘a significant step 
towards further democratisation in Myanmar’ by the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 8  ASEAN is the regional group of which 
Myanmar has been a member since 1997. Within ASEAN, the European Union 
raised its concerns about Myanmar and ‘encouraged positive changes.’9   
 
The transformations in Myanmar gave way to a new phase in the relations 
with the European Union. The European Council suspended the visa ban on 
cabinet members and other high ranking officials in 2011, and placed 
Myanmar under the Everything but Arms (EBA) regime. High Representative 
Ashton opened a EU Office in Yangon, which was later upgraded to a 
Delegation. The European Union has more than doubled the development aid  
(to about 150 million euros for 2012-13), explored the feasibility of a bilateral 
investment agreement, and reinstated the system of generalised tariff 
preferences with Yangon in mid 2013. It expanded bilateral trade with 
Myanmar (226.37 million dollars in 2012) as well as Myanmar’s exports to the 
EU (43.54 million dollars) and imports from the EU (182.83 million dollars),10 
all of which are vital to Myanmar (with a GDP of US$ 876 in 2010).11 It 
allocated initial funds to the Myanmar Peace Centre in Yangon (EUR 
700,000) in 2012, and further contributed EUR 30 million in 2013 to the 
ethnic peace process. 12  It has agreed to the building up of a lasting EU-
                                                             
5 Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) is constitutionally protected and exempted from civilian oversight. 
Article 20(b) of the Constitution gives the military complete authority over the ministries of defence, 
interior and border affairs, as it appoints all three ministers. Article 109(b) and 141(b) reserve 25 % of 
parliamentary seats for the military, which in effect gives them a veto over any attempts to alter the 
Constitution because of the supermajority required for revision. D. Tonkin, EastAsiaForum, 3 May, 
2013.  
6 A. MacDonald, EastAsiaForum, 1st May, 2013. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/01/the-
tatmadaws-new-position-in-myanmar-politics/>, accessed 19 September 2013.  
7 Council Conclusions, 23 April 2012. 
8 Chairman’s Statement, 20th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, 2012, (paragr. 87). ASEAN is formed by 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, which are the five founding states, to 
which later Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia also joined, totaling ten members.  
9 EEAS Myanmar,<http://eeas.europe.eu/myanmar/index en.htm>, accessed 14 November 2012. 
10 Myanmar, EU agrees to use forum to advance ties. 20 June 2013. 
<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/790343.shtml#.UdrvwpX3AfE>, accessed 19 September 2013.  
11 United Nations, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, <http://unstats.un.org/>, accessed 19 
September 2013.   
12 European Commission, IP/12/1167.   
Myanmar partnership.13 To turn commitments into reality, a joint Task Force 
met in Myanmar in November 2013,14 following the first Myanmar-EU Forum 
in Nay Pyi Taw in June 2013. The Council has indicated that, having imposed 
sanctions calling for a change, it now feels a responsibility to help, and assist 
the government in rebuilding its place in the international community. 15 
These developments offer an opportunity to review the EU’s efforts to induce 
Myanmar’s military regime to work towards political transformation. These 
developments raise the question: what are the elements of continuity and 
change in EU behaviour within its interaction with ASEAN with regard to 
Myanmar? As the EU has used the ASEAN framework to raise and discuss its 
concerns about Myanmar, the Association’s behaviour also comes into focus.  
 
This is an empirical investigation hinging on the evolution of the EU in world 
affairs via its political ties to ASEAN. The EU’s concern that the Myanmar 
issue not destabilise its relations with ASEAN has remained constant. Changes 
have been identified as forming three different phases: 1991-1997, 1998-2006 
and 2007-2012. The aspiration to escape from pervasive China 16  and the 
desirability of new partners were crucial factors in the realisation of these 
changes. Official documents from the EU, the European Commission, and 
European Council Conclusions and Common Positions, speeches and 
declarations issued at ASEAN, Asia-Europe and other meetings, together with 
Southeast Asian and European newspapers, secondary sources and interviews 
conducted in Myanmar in January 2013, including one with a former EU 
Special Envoy for Myanmar and ASEAN leaders, contribute to this work. 
Many scholars have hinted at the extent to which the issue of Myanmar has 
caused problems to the EU-ASEAN links, but no emphasis has been made of 
the extent to which the Myanmar case has conversely helped to reinforce the 
long-lasting EU-ASEAN relationship; that is the focus of this article.  
 
Official documents and recent publications  
 
How can we explore the European Union’s attention to Myanmar through its 
connections with ASEAN (the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an offshoot of 
ASEAN), 17  and have similar investigations already been conducted? The 
analytical approach employed in this article builds upon official documents 
both by the EU and the European Commission that envision the EU’s strategy 
towards Southeast Asia. The ASEAN group is a central element, and Myanmar 
is connected by the EU discourse to ASEAN when it appears in the 
documents, which include: the 1994 Communication of the Commission to the 
                                                             
13 Joint statement, Brussels, 5 March 2013, EUCO 58/13. 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/135830.pdf>, accessed 19 
September 2013.  
14 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-176_en.htm> accessed 19 September 2013.   
15 Council conclusions on the Comprehensive Framework for the European Union’s policy and support 
to Myanmar/Burma, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 22 July 2013.  
16 Hatred for India is also an issue within Myanmar.  
17 Asia-Europe Meeting is considered an emanation of the Association because negotiations for the first 
ASEM summit were carried out through the interregional dialogue channel between ASEAN and the EU 
(Yeo 2013, 332). ASEM reflected ASEAN’s ambition to promote an East Asian regionalism around the 
ASEAN core (Manea 2013, 321-2). L. Yeo, ‘The Asia-Europe Meeting’ in T. Christiansen, E. Kirchener 
and P. Murray, (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2013, pp. 330-343. M. 
G. Manea, ‘The Institutional Dimension of EU-ASEAN Plus Three Inter-regional Relations,’ in 
Christiansen et al (eds), op. cit., pp. 313-329.   
Council ‘Towards A New Asia Strategy;’ 18  the 2001 Commission 
Communication on ‘Europe and Asia:  A Strategic Framework for Enhanced 
Partnerships;’ 19  the 2003 Communication from the Commission ‘A new 
partnership with South East Asia;’ 20  the 2007 European Commission’s 
‘Country Strategy Paper on Myanmar;’ 21  and the 2013 ‘Comprehensive 
Framework for the European Union’s policy and support to 
Myanmar/Burma.’ 22  As the Commission explains (1994), the term ‘Asia’ 
includes three sub-regions, one of which is Southeast Asia.  
 
These documents support the following strategic setting concerning the EU: 
the establishment of an important presence in Southeast Asia is claimed to 
allow the European Union to ensure that its interests (in economic and 
security matters – arms control, non-proliferation and the security of the sea 
lanes) are fully acknowledged in this key region.23 The EU’s intention to raise 
its political and economic presence across the region to a level commensurate 
with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU is another claim, to which 
the key priority of further strengthening the long-standing partnership with 
ASEAN contributes. 24  The account that economic imperatives for closer 
cooperation are based on the fact that Southeast Asia is set to become one of 
the most dynamic growth areas in the world economy has supported the EU’s 
proposition to revitalise its relations with ASEAN. 25  The 2007 document 
discloses that EU Ministers were ready to discuss Burmese matters with their 
Myanmar counterparts at several regional meetings (ASEAN-EU Ministerial, 
ASEM, or bilaterally at the margins of these meetings).26 And finally, the 2013 
document shows that the EU’s goals include assisting Myanmar’s government 
in reestablish its place in the international community and helping it to reap 
the benefits of its integration into ASEAN.27 These discourses of the EU frame 
the observation of the European Union’s behaviour within EU-ASEAN’s 
interactions with regard to Myanmar, and will later serve to assess the EU’s 
behaviour over the period considered. 
 
Recent publications  
 
An examination of the literature in this field reveals that some researchers 
have considered the EU’s relationship to Myanmar, explained how the EU has 
jeopardised its relations with ASEAN through its criticism of that country,28 
and provided suggestions about how the EU might support reform in 
Myanmar.29 An overview of recent developments there,30 and a focus on the 
                                                             
18 COM(94)314, Brussels, 13 July 1994. 
19 COM(2001) 469, Brussels 4 September 2001.  
20 COM(2003)399, Brussels, 9 July 2003.    
21 The EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013).  
22 Council conclusions, 22 July 2013.  
23 COM(94)314, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 
24 COM(2003)399, op. cit., pp. 3, 22.  
25 COM(2003)399, op. cit., p. 3.   
26 The EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013), op. cit., p. 20.  
27 Council conclusions, 22 July 2013, op. cit., pp. 2, 4.   
28 S.B. duRocher, ‘The European Union, Burma/Myanmar and ASEAN: A challenge to European norms 
and values or a new opportunity?,’ Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 10, Nos. 2-3, 2012, pp. 165-180.  
29 J. Parello-Plesner, ‘How the EU can support Reform in Burma’, European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2012, pp. 1-9. 
<http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/how_the_eu_can_support_reform_in_burma>, accessed 19 
September 2013.     
reforms have also been provided.31 The issue of whether the EU’s sanctions 
induce undemocratic governments to change their ruling system formed the 
topic of a case study on Myanmar.32 Another recent contribution reviewed the 
comprehensive ties between the EU and ASEAN, paying brief attention to 
Myanmar as a permanent point of contention.33 Research on how interaction 
is central to analysing human rights, as part of the process of ASEAN’s 
identity formation, has also been published, shedding some light on the 
diplomatic incidents and tensions that arose when the EU embarked on a 
region-to-region interaction with Myanmar.34 The argument that the EU’s 
targeted (rather than full) sanctions allowed the EU member states to protect 
their commercial and/or political interests in Myanmar was also sustained (p. 
158).35 An evaluation of ASEM in its first decade (including both how it has 
been considered as the way out of the EU-ASEAN deadlock on Myanmar and 
how it has been challenged by the crisis) was made available.36 The issue of 
Myanmar’s inclusion in the 2004 ASEM enlargement has been explored.37 An 
investigation of EU-ASEAN ties with attention to values, norms and culture, 
and also to Myanmar is accessible.38 The view that ASEAN’s intra-regional 
and inter-regional human rights interactions with Europe are mutually 
dependent was discussed with ample reference to Myanmar.39 The argument 
of how the EU-ASEAN relationship may turn out to be not only rich in 
declarations but also of a substantial character has been considered, though 
Myanmar was dealt with only briefly.40 The lessons that the EU offers for 
Myanmar’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2014 are also available together with the 
EU views on the 2015 elections.41 
 
Other publications have centred on EU ASEAN links, or on ASEM, but not all 
of them have paid attention to Myanmar. The lessons that the EU could learn 
                                                                                                                                                                              
30 L. Rieffel, Myanmar on the Move: An Overview of Recent Developments,’ Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2012, pp. 31-49.  
31 M. Bunte and C. Portela, ‘Myanmar: The Beginning of Reform and the End of Sanctions,’ policy brief, 
GIGA Focus International, No. 3, German Institute for Global and Area Studies: Hamburg, June, 2012.  
32 C. Portela,  European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy. When and why do they work? London, 
Routledge, 2010; C. P. Portela, P. Vennesson, ‘Sanctions and Embargoes in EU-Asia Relations’ in 
Christiansen et al (eds), 2013, pp. 198-210.  
33 G. Brettner-Messler,‘EU and ASEAN – The Interregional Relationship between Europe and Asia’, in 
Gareis, SB., G. Hauser and F. Kernic, (eds) The European Union: A Global Actor?, Opladen/Farmington 
Hills, Budrich Publishers, 2012, pp. 138-160.  
34 M. Manea, ‘How and Why Interaction Matters: ASEAN Regional Identity and Human Rights,’ 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2009, pp. 27-49.  
35 K. Smith, ‘The Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism: The EU and Burma/Myanmar, Cuba and 
Zimbabwe,’ in Elgstrom, O. Smith, M. (eds) The European Union’s Roles in International Politics. 
Concepts and Analysis, London, Routledge, 2006.  
36 ‘ASEM in its Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward,’ European Background Study, University of 
Helsinki, 2006.  
37 E. Fitriani, ‘ASEM and Southeast Asian countries’ foreign policy. Study case: The issue of Myanmar in 
the 2004 ASEM enlargement,’ ISEAS Singapore, forthcoming, pp.1-37.  
38 N. A. deFlers, ‘EU-ASEAN Relations: The Importance of Values, Norms and Culture’, Working Paper 
No. 1, EU Centre in Singapore, 2010.  
39 M. Manea, ‘Human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe: ASEAN-EU 
relations and ASEM,’ The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2008, pp. 369-396.   
40 J. Moeller, ‘ASEAN’s Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities,’ 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No 3, 2007, pp.465-482.   
41 L. Marchi, ‘Myanmar’s ASEAN challenges,’ New Mandala, Australian National University, 2014, 
<http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/05/13/myanmars-asean-challenges/>, accessed 13 
May 2014.  
from ASEAN have been explained,42 and the EU’s limited strategic approach 
to Asia criticised.43 Reflections on different aspects of EU-Asia relations were 
included in a handbook,44 and a selection of topics from an interdisciplinary 
perspective concerning these relations was made available.45 Further studies 
sought to shed light on the importance of ASEM from a European 
perspective, 46  and examined the EU’s foreign policy in the Asia Pacific 
region.47 A less recent work explored the EU in Southeast Asia together with 
its ties to ASEAN.48 While Casarini made no reference to Myanmar, Zhou and 
Forster did so only indirectly.   
 
Other analysts have studied Sino-Myanmar relations explained how China 
emerged as the most important foreign actor in Myanmar after the Western 
boycott of its industrial and agricultural sectors49 and examined how a series 
of events, since mid-2011, including the rapid improvement of Myanmar’s 
relationship with the West, have ‘frustrated’ China’s aspiration to engage in a 
‘loyal friend’ partnership with Myanmar.50 Other observers have focused on 
the potential sources of instability that Myanmar faces in its surrounding 
region, which could threaten its neighbours, including China.51 A further work 
centred on Myanmar’s President Sein’s priorities and civil society’s role in 
representing the popular interests,52 while yet another analysed the problem 
of democracy in Myanmar.53 Explanations of how the recent political changes 
in Myanmar came about,54 and how peace prospects may evolve, with a strong 
emphasis on human right claims, have also been offered,55 together with an 
exploration of the major trends in Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar 
(1989-2011). 56  A brief hint at Myanmar in its geopolitical complexity 
                                                             
42 K. Mahbubani,‘Can the EU learn lessons from ASEAN?,’ 2012,  
<http://www.mahbubani.net/articles%20by%20dean/can-the-eu-learn-lessons-from-asean.pdf>, 
accessed December 2012.  
43 K. Engelbrek, ‘The Missing Link in the EU's Nascent Strategic Approach toward Asia: Military 
Diplomacy,’ Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2012. 
44 Christiansen et al. (eds) op. cit.   
45 D. Novotny and C. Portela (eds) EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century. Strategic Partnership in 
the Making, New York, Palgrave, 2012. 
46 W. Zhou, ‘Beyond A Trade Agenda: EU’s Interregional Approach Towards East Asia’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol 16, 2011, pp.  407-426. 
47 N. Casarini, ‘EU Foreign Policy in the Asia Pacific: Striking the Right Balance Between the US, China 
and ASEAN,’ EUISS, 2012, pp. 1-6.    
48 A. Forster, ‘The European Union in South-East Asia: continuity and change in turbulent times,’ 
International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4, 1999, pp. 743-758.  
49 N. Swanstrom, ‘Sino-Myanmar Relations: Security and Beyond’, Institute for Security and 
Development Policy, Stockholm, 2012, pp.1-25.    
50 Y. Sun, ‘China’s Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar,’ Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 
Vol. 1, 2012, pp. 73-96.  
51 J. Kurlantzick, ‘Myanmar: Sources of Instability and Potential for US-China Cooperation,’ Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2011.    
52 M. Thuzar, ‘Myanmar: No Turning Back,’ Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.1, 2012, pp.203-219.  
53 D. Steinberg, ‘The Problem of Democracy in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar: Neither Nation-
State Nor State-Nation?’ Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol.1, 2012, pp. 220-237.  
54 K. Hlaing, ‘Understanding Recent Political Changes in Myanmar’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 
34, No. 2, 2012, pp. 197-216.  
55 A. South, ‘The Politics of Protection in Burma. Beyond the Humanitarian Mainstream,’ Critical Asian 
Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2012, pp. 175-204. T. Kramer, ‘Ending 50 years of military rule? Prospects for 
peace, democracy and development in Burma’, NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource 
Centre, 2012, pp. 1-14.   
56  J. Bissinger, ‘Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust?’ 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2012, pp. 23-52. 
considered in the security regionalism of the Asia-Pacific area was proposed.57 
The argument that ASEAN’s failure to take a stronger line on Myanmar has 
less to do with its non-interference norms than with the interests of the 
region’s illiberal elites has been sustained. 58  An analysis of how different 
socio-economic interests shape foreign policy in the ASEAN states is 
accessible, with a focus on the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar 
Caucus.59 A recent extensive examination of all of the developments which 
have characterised Myanmar over the years, including its participation in 
ASEAN, is now available.60 Less recent, but equally important, analyses have 
focused on the complex relations between Myanmar and ASEAN,61 together 
with the discussion of Myanmar’s foreign policy goals before 2007.62 Also, the 
way in which ASEAN might have affected political change in Myanmar has 
been the subject of study,63 as well as ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture 
with regard to Myanmar.64 Yet, none of these works made any mention at all 
of the European Union. 
  
It is true, therefore, that Myanmar has become the focus of increasing 
attention among scholars and observers alike. However, an observation of the 
evolution of EU behaviour within EU-ASEAN’s interactions with regard to 
Myanmar (through the reading of EU, ASEAN and ASEM official documents) 
in order to shed light on continuity in the EU’s as well as on changes in the 
EU’s and ASEAN’s conduct, as this article seeks to undertake, is not yet 
available. The present article intends to contribute to filling this gap.   
 
The three distinct phases in action  
 
How did the European Union interact with ASEAN regarding Myanmar? The 
policy of dialogue between the European Community (EC) and ASEAN (which 
established itself as a regional group in 1967) developed due to trade and 
economic interests. Inter-regional relations were formalized in 1977, and the 
first official connections were based on the ASEAN-EC Cooperation 
Agreement of 1980. This agreement incorporated the areas of commerce, 
economy and development. The procedures for the EU ASEAN dialogue 
consisted of an annual meeting of foreign ministers, and additional special 
meetings as required. 
 
                                                             
57 C. Hughes, ‘New Security Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: Extending Regionalism from Southeast to 
Northeast Asia,’ The International Spectator, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2007, pp. 319-335.   
58  L. Jones, ‘ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma’s Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical 
Disengagement,’ Asian Security, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2008, pp. 271-293.     
59 L. Jones, ‘Democratization and foreign policy in Southeast Asia: the case of the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2009, pp. 
387-406.   
60 J. Haacke, ‘Myanmar: now a site for Sino-US Geopolitical Competition?’, LSE IDEAS, 2012; J. 
Haacke, ‘The Myanmar imbroglio and ASEAN: heading towards the 2010 elections,’ International 
Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1, 2010, pp. 153-174.   
61  J. Haacke, ‘Myanmar and ASEAN’ The Adelphi Papers, Vol 46, No. 381, 2007a, pp. 41-60.  
62 J. Haacke, ‘The Political-Security Imperative and Foreign Policy Goals’, The Adelphi Papers, Vol. 46, 
No. 381, 2007b, pp. 13-24.   
63 J. Haacke, ‘ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?’ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol.30, No. 3, 2008, pp. 351-378.   
64 J. Haacke, ‘Enhanced Interaction” with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN 
Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, 
No. 2, 2005, pp. 188-216.    
Different approaches  
 
The two regional groups adopted distinct approaches to Myanmar. More 
generally, the European Union was inclined to enhance its ‘global role’ and 
extend its influence to Asia and Southeast Asia. With the entering into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, along with the changes that this introduced in 
institutional and political terms, the EU embraced an ‘all-inclusive policy’ in 
external relations, incorporating a variety of issues. This comprehensive policy 
particularly focused on the consolidation of democracy, sustainable 
development and good governance. The beliefs in freedom from fear, respect 
for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, freedom from 
want, and social wellbeing in all of its aspects lay at the basis of the ‘good 
governance’ of the European Union. These values would later, in 2003, be 
included in the European Security Strategy. The EU’s interpretation of ‘global 
security’ respected the principle that all states needed sufficient access to the 
above ‘goods.’65 This approach was to apply also to Myanmar.66  
 
For ASEAN, the compliance with the non-interference norm to its members’ 
conduct of internal affairs was one of the principles it held, as a signatory of 
the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The ASEAN members 
placed great emphasis on the belief in ‘mutual respect for independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and national identity.’ They declared 
loyalty to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and adherence to 
‘justice and the rule of law’ as ideals to defend when they undersigned the 
Bangkok Declaration of 1967, constitutive of their group. ASEAN had not 
interpreted the political repression in Myanmar as an issue of democratic 
rights, as had the EU. Repression was an internal problem that could 
eventually be dealt with bilaterally. ASEAN developed a ‘quiet’ and informal 
style of diplomacy to Myanmar that showed respect, tolerance for diversity 
and a commitment to non-criticism of the junta.67  
 
The European Union engaged in a sanction strategy through its own channel 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (which was introduced by 
the Maastricht Treaty and reinforced by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties in 
1999 and 2001).68 The EU sanctions are understood here as measures taken in 
reply to Myanmar’s junta behaviour, which the EU maintained was contrary 
to international law.69 They are considered part of the bargaining process, 
stressing that the ability to reciprocate concessions made by the targeted state 
was essential for success. They are not intended to be repressive or punitive 
but, rather, coercive measures. The CFSP common positions were supported 
by the unanimity requirement of the Council. The CFSP provisions were 
supervised by the Council, which regularly reported to the Presidency and the 
European Commission, in order to review the decisions adopted in the light of 
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new developments in Myanmar. When needed, further measures were 
deliberated, and, in the case of improvements, the suspension of particular 
restrictions was considered as well as the gradual resumption of cooperation, 
as reported in the Council Common Position (CCP) (96/635/CFSP) of 28 
October 1996. These developments however occurred over a long period and 
in fact the sanctions against Myanmar were renewed over several years.70   
 
ASEAN’s line of opposition to the discourse of the EU on good governance 
(and democratic issues) grew steadily. Paradoxically the balance of 
preferences within the Asian group was inclined to favour states, which were 
governed by authoritarian regimes. The latter were keen to exclude attempts 
to enter into an intra-regional debate on governance and humanitarian 
themes. Yet there were exceptions, such as ASEAN states developing national, 
liberal-democratic, political frameworks (Philippines and Thailand), and non-
state actors engaged in different fields of social activism. Notwithstanding this 
intra-regional debate’s fragmentation, the rejection of the ‘external other’71 
was the common pattern uniting both the supporters of democracy and 
authoritarianism. In its relations with the EU concerning Myanmar, the 
Association defended its opposition to ‘external interferences’ (and to the 
good governance line). Hence, as the EU insisted on sanctions, ASEAN 
rejected censure of the regime by its EU dialogue partner, as it has been 
observed throughout the 1991-1997 period. Later, in the 1998-2006 period, 
the EU moderated its criticism of Myanmar, while the Association appeared to 
distance itself from rejecting censure of the regime by its EU dialogue, and 
subsequently, throughout the 2007-2012 period, the EU employed targeted 
sanctions and limited development cooperation, while ASEAN encouraged 
better governance. The respective developments characterising these three 
phases will now be explored.    
 
The 1991-1997 years  
 
The European Union’s pressure for change on the military regime built up in 
the aftermath of the junta’s violent response to the Burmese pro-democracy 
demonstrations in 1988. However, only in 1991 did the EU act officially and 
collectively with sanctions prompted by the junta’s failure to recognise the 
results of the May 1990 elections. These earned Suu Kyi’s National League for 
Democracy 59 per cent of the votes, and would have guaranteed 80 per cent of 
the parliament seats. Suu Kyi had been under house arrest since 1989. 
According to the Council, the EU was disappointed at the unwillingness of 
SLORC, the military junta, to enter into a meaningful dialogue with it, and 
reaffirmed its determination to resume such dialogue at some point in the 
future. The Council agreed to the suspension of development aid (excluding 
humanitarian aid programmes) and on the establishment of diplomatic 
sanctions.72 Sanctions embargoed weapons and their ammunition and the 
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maintenance and transfer of military technology. At the meetings with 
ASEAN, the EU ‘expressed its overall interest in democracy (and human 
rights’), raising the irritation of the Association’s members (in Kuala Lumpur 
in 1990, Luxemburg in 1991, and Manila in 1992), while ASEAN maintained 
its critical stance towards the European Union when communicating with it. 
However, in 1994, the Foreign Ministers of the two regional groups agreed on 
a joint Declaration in Karlsruhe within which they ‘expressed the hope that 
ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement and the EU’s willingness to 
engage in a critical dialogue will eventually contribute to achieving more 
sustainable improvements in all fields’ (paragraph 34). ASEAN’s policy of 
constructive engagement indicated ‘a mix of moderate diplomacy and greater 
economic interaction’ which was respectful of the non-interference ideology.73 
The Commission’s Communication of 1994, ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’, 
began with the statement that the ‘rise of Asia [was] dramatically changing the 
world balance of economic power’ (p. 1). As a strategy, the EU aimed to 
remain included in the Southeast Asian region. The controversy over 
Myanmar was in some way watered down, as it arose in Karlsruhe, and 
relations tended to focus on economic ties.74   
 
The 1996 Council’s request for the unconditional release of political prisoners 
and introduction of additional sanctions were motivated by the junta’s further 
repressive behaviour.75 With the EU’s policy in Southeast Asia focusing on 
respect for democratic principles and associated themes (which ‘together 
form[ed] a major objective of the external policy of the European Union’ – p. 
12),76 Myanmar increasingly became the centre of attention of EU-ASEAN 
affairs. The argument of diversity of vision took broader shape that same year, 
1996, when the Association’s heads of state granted observer status to 
Myanmar within ASEAN.   
 
The 1997 crisis: Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN  
 
The Association’s enlargement77 led its respective new members to join the 
1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement. By contrast, Myanmar ‘was 
excluded … because of its lack of democracy and its poor human rights 
record.’78 The EU-ASEAN meetings were cancelled in winter 1997. The EU 
protracted its previous sanctions for a further six months.79 Sanctions were 
mostly directed at the industrial and agricultural areas as a response to the 
use of forced labour. The measures also involved the withdrawal of Myanmar’s 
access to the system of generalized tariff preferences. The Council declared 
that, having discussed the implications of Myanmar’s admittance to ASEAN, it 
expected such a membership to contribute to the promotion of democratic 
principles. The European Union had some difficulty in coping with Myanmar’s 
accession. The EU was a human rights advocate, as well as accountable to the 
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national parliaments and the European Parliament, and, furthermore, it was 
constrained by the unanimity principle on which EU’s foreign policy 
formulation was based. ASEAN had no strict criteria for membership and had 
‘never made it conditional to political reform.’ 80  With the Association’s 
inclusion of Myanmar together with Cambodia and Laos, and previously (in 
1995) of Vietnam, ASEAN was becoming more representative of the region. 
The European Union had more reason than ever to confirm its intention ‘to 
raise the profile of Europe’ in Southeast Asia (p. 4),81 and was even inclined to 
take a pragmatic course, putting aside sensitive issues.  
 
Continuing the dialogue?  
 
In 1996, during the EU-ASEAN political crisis, Singapore’s Prime Minister 
(Goh Chok Tong) proposed the Asia-Europe Meeting.82 ASEM would allow the 
parties to resume the dialogue for at least three reasons. First, ASEM (which 
included 15 EU member states, the European Commission’s President and the 
ASEAN members) had the advantage of accepting also China, Japan and 
South Korea, and allowed for the incorporation of India and Pakistan. Second, 
the participating states were to meet bi-annually. This configured a looser 
structure than the procedures for the EU ASEAN dialogue. In the years in-
between the summits, foreign ministers held their meetings. The novelty of 
ASEM’s role lay also in its capacity to also offer a forum for the presentation of 
viewpoints, as a kind of preparation for the later discussions at the 
appropriate summits.83 Third, the process was very informal. The instruments 
for implementing the collective agreements were the (economic and political) 
protocols. Protocols implied simple procedures if compared to the 
Cooperation Agreements which needed the European Parliament’s 
authorisation. For the European Union, ASEM constituted a new structure 
and a new approach. Few choices were available to the EU in its attempt to 
continue the dialogue with the Southeast Asian states, and the Union 
welcomed the ASEM process. 84  Yet, the EU’s continued use of coercion 
towards Myanmar was expressed in the Council’s declaration that its 
membership of ASEAN did ‘not automatically imply membership of ASEM’,85 
a position that created further controversy. Rejecting censure of Myanmar’s 
regime from its EU dialogue partner, in none of ASEM’s conclusive official 
documents did ASEAN make explicit reference to Myanmar or to the situation 
there.86    
 
Burmese perceptions on sanctions and beyond 
 
What are the perceptions of the European Union and its policy among the 
people in Myanmar? Burmese perspectives on the EU and its action are hard 
to qualify. Some among civil society in recent interviews have stated that they 
have no idea what the European Union is, while others preferred to ignore it, 
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taking the view that the Burmese people have not been helped but penalised. 
Myanmar’s development has been curbed: ‘how could we have a positive 
conception of the EU?’ If there was an idea of restraining the junta from 
acquiring arms, time had been lost due to the embargo because the 
SLORC/SPDC had obtained weapons through Singapore, China and Russia, to 
mention only a few providers.87 A ‘well-informed’ Burmese citizen dismissed 
sanctions. The military in power turned the circumstance of being countered 
by external forces to its advantage. Domestically, the junta defied the 
situation, and strengthened the significance of the principle of non-
interference in Myanmar’s affairs, reinforcing the argument that Myanmar’s 
sovereignty was a value to be respected.88 A similar judgment concerning 
sanctions upheld that the SPDC was disturbed, but not to the extent intended 
by the sanctions. ‘Restrictive actions’ built up the junta’s attention to privilege 
its neighbourhood, and at the same time secured its protection within the 
region.89 On the extent of the preoccupation with economic restraint, some 
responses indicated that it was true that poverty had increased nationwide 
and that the local industries had been weakened. There was no alternative but 
to accept this and, anyway, people knew that the country was rich in natural 
resources. The extraction sector was trading well, particularly through 
Thailand. These resources would have been further exploited in future and 
people believed that a better future existed. 90  Others insisted that the 
hardship (i.e. sanctions) created by the EU for the junta had no support in the 
region. At times, there had been (political) adversity to overcome with certain 
states, but some other countries were very supportive and helped to maintain 
balanced relations. The junta also operated in the region’s interest (i.e. 
ASEAN), not over-reacting to criticism when this occurred. The SPDC has 
understood that the neighbouring countries were under intense international 
pressure, which was negatively affecting their project of deepening 
integration.91 Not everybody in Myanmar supported Su Kyi. There was some 
indifference if not opposition against the NLD’s leader. One of the areas where 
such attitudes were unveiled was the region around Pathein in Mon State, 
which has been severely hit by Cyclone Nargis, in May 2008, during which 
140,000 died.92 With regard to Myanmar’s unexpected turn to the West, the 
interviews with Burmese people and ASEAN leaders suggested that it was not 
the constrictions imposed by the Union (and by other international actors) but 
rather the reality of the hatred for China within Myanmar that proved the 
driving force. China exploited many natural resources and abused the 
conditions of poverty and underdevelopment. Irritation at the encroaching 
role played by China in Myanmar and the desirability of new partners 
contributed to make the impetus for change and reform.93   
 
 
 
 
                                                             
87 Interview with a Burmese academic, Yangon, January 2013.   
88 Interviews with members of civil society, Myanmar Book Centre, Yangon, January 2013.  
89 Interview with a South Korean diplomat, Yangon, January 2013.  
90 Interview with an officer of a governmental agency, Nyaungshwe, Shan State, January 2013.   
91 Interview with an academic, Myanmar Book Centre, Yangon, January 2013.   
92 Interview with a member of the NLD near Pathein in Mon State, January 2013.  
93 Interviews with Burmese people, British Council, Yangon centre, January 2013, and with ASEAN 
leaders, Macau, May 2013.  
EU behaviour and statements 
 
What does the observation of EU behaviour within the EU-ASEAN interaction 
convey with regard to Myanmar? During its 1997 rupture with ASEAN over 
the Burmese accession, the European Union issued a declaration intended to 
soothe the crisis: ‘The EU looks forward to continued close cooperation 
between our two respective regions [and] … would like … to re-affirm its 
commitment to the EU-ASEAN dialogue.’94 More evidence emerged due to the 
EU’s attitude to the Asia-Europe Meeting’s new framework of resuming the 
dead consultations. In a Commission document, in 2001, the appeal of ASEM 
was put into focus: ‘The value of the ASEM process will be further enhanced 
through a broader participation.’ 95  The EU appears keen to avoid the 
Myanmar issue destabilising its relations with ASEAN. An additional element 
has also emerged. Previously, in 1997, after firmly countering Yangon’s 
association, the EU not only accepted but also stated that ‘the Council agreed 
that the opportunity of the EU-ASEAN dialogue should be used to discuss the 
situation in Burma/Myanmar’ (p. 8).96 Hence the Council emphasised the 
welcoming occasion to reinforce the dialogue with the Southeast Asian 
countries via this new commitment regarding Myanmar. This is a new 
position describing the EU-ASEAN relationship vis-à-vis Myanmar. 
 
From 1998-2006  
 
In the aftermath of the problems arising from the 1997 dialogue, a 
combination of external influences and domestic dynamics contributed 
towards changing both the EU and ASEAN’s attitude towards Myanmar. 
Firstly, as early as 1994, the EU had expressed an intention ‘to accord Asia a 
higher priority than [was] at present the case’, an objective that remained 
valid. An important component of the EU’s position was the pursuit of ‘new 
proactive strategies towards Asia.’ 97  These aspects reconfirmed the EU’s 
positive stance on ASEAN, and militated against a rigid approach to Myanmar 
within the Association. The new position resulted in the Council attempting to 
start using the suspension of sanctions (April 2003) as a way to obtain 
compliance,98 developing a two-pronged strategy by employing both positive 
and negative actions. Secondly, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 led 
ASEAN members to question the ability of their group to provide a solution to 
several problems, throwing the Association’s collective identity in disarray.99 
Indonesia, and particularly Thailand and the Philippines increasingly 
criticised ASEAN’s practice of refraining from interference, and called for a 
policy of ‘flexible engagement.’ The latter intended to allow ASEAN to address 
the regional crisis caused by the domestic situation. The de-legitimisation of 
the argument of ‘good government without democracy,’ which was central to 
ASEAN’s policy, contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia in 
1998 and also to its democratisation. These developments forced a revision of 
the non-interference dogma, and also restructured the field of the human 
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rights discourse among ASEAN countries. Hence, democratic and 
humanitarian issues’ interactions became possible also between ASEAN and 
the EU. The Association’s reaction to the consequences of the economic crisis 
supported a new input on integration (ASEAN vision 2020 issued in 1997, 
Hanoi Plan of Action in 1998). Thirdly, some understanding between the EU 
and ASEAN on Myanmar intended to induce the SPDC to temper its 
repressive behaviour towards the NLD and its followers, and accept the 
constitution of a EU Troika to assess improvements in the country in this 
regard. To balance this concession, the EU was to lessen its inflexible policy 
on the SPDC. All of these developments encouraged both the EU to tone down 
its criticism of Myanmar and ASEAN to distance itself from rejecting censure 
of the regime by its EU partner.100  
 
Changes in action?  
 
Signs of the EU’s weakening criticism of Myanmar were provided by the 
opening of a Burmese diplomatic representation in Brussels around the year 
2000, and by the Council introduction of several measures on 
democratisation assistance. At the same time, the Council reinstated 
sanctions.101 Also, ASEAN modified its language at ASEM3, in Seoul in 2000 
in the Chairman’s Statement.  Myanmar was not cited, but problems similar to 
those in Myanmar were mentioned. Again, no particular indication 
concerning that country was given by ASEAN in Copenhagen, in 2002 
(ASEM4). In April 2003, the EU tried to suspend sanctions until October, and 
pledged to refrain from re-imposing the measures if ‘substantive progress 
towards national reconciliation, [together with] the restoration of democratic 
order’ had been made by then.102 Shortly afterwards, a new confrontation (the 
Depayin incident) played against the EU’s opening, and the Council negated 
the suspension before the announced deadline.103  
 
Confirming the changes: The Depayin incident and beyond  
 
An attitudinal change among the Association towards the military junta was 
induced by the events of 30 May 2003, in particular the attack on the 
supporters of the opposition leader and Suu Kyi’s reinstated house arrest. The 
Association was now openly speaking out about transition in Myanmar in the 
Joint Communiqué of ASEAN ministers of June 2003, delivered in Phnom 
Pen. ‘Democracy’ was a new word which entered the Association’s official 
documents. The junta’s domestic conduct and particularly the treatment of 
Suu Kyi now became an ‘issue’ in ASEAN’s relations with Myanmar. The 
attitudinal change was confirmed by ASEAN’s members, notably by Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister who argued that Myanmar should be expelled from ASEAN if 
it ‘did not release Suu Kyi and another 1,400 political prisoners.’ 104  Very 
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distinctively, the Thai Prime Minister ‘offered to mediate’ between the junta 
and the broader regional and international community, and discuss a 
‘roadmap toward democracy’ by bringing together all of the countries 
concerned.105 Also, the media reacted to the incidents by calling on ‘every 
ASEAN leader to send a strong individual message to Yangon.’106  
 
Observing ASEAN behaviour  
 
The principle of ‘performance legitimacy’ was thoroughly reconsidered by 
ASEAN leaders in the Bali declaration (Concord II) of October 2003, and soon 
afterwards in the ASEM5 Chairman’s Statement in Hanoi of October 2004, 
where they made recommendations to the SPDC. The Hanoi statement was 
the most complete declaration that ASEAN issued regarding expectations 
related to Myanmar. 107  The substance of the message was new, with all 
stakeholders engaged in that country being invited to join forces to guarantee 
positive consequences for reconciliation. It gave weight to the NDL, its leader 
and to other movements, which opposed the junta, and indicated that there 
were forums to be freed up for a ‘genuine debate.’ 
 
Not so ‘moderated’ and not so ‘accommodating’: Myanmar’s 
accession to ASEM in 2004  
 
The EU’s insistence on sanctioning Yangon and ASEAN’s refusal to 
accommodate the EU position resurfaced. Together with expressing concern 
about the SPDC, the 2004 Hanoi (ASEM5) Statement ‘warmly welcomed the 
Union of Myanmar’ at the Asia-Europe Meeting.108 Diplomatic crises followed 
and two meetings of ASEM finance ministers were cancelled. On ASEAN’s 
side, there had been preparatory talks on Myanmar’s admittance prior to the 
Hanoi summit. The Indonesian Foreign Minister pretended to instruct that no 
political conditions had to be attached. The Cambodian Prime Minister 
affirmed that his country would not have joined ASEM without the other two 
new ASEAN members (Laos and Myanmar) being accepted at the same time. 
Before the Hanoi summit, in August 2004, Myanmar’s Prime Minister 
(General Khin Nyunt) met Vietnam’s Prime Minister (Phan Van Khai) to 
discuss Yangon’s participation. The meeting was attended by Hanoi-based 
ambassadors and ASEAN members’ diplomats, all demonstrating the extent 
of ASEAN’s great solidarity.109 On the EU side, the Council conceded the 
presence of Myanmar’s representatives ‘where a political dialogue [was] 
conducted that directly promote[d] … the rule of law in Burma/Myanmar.’ At 
the same time, it expanded the sanctions. 110  Why were ASEAN members 
tolerating a pariah state to the point of offering it inclusion at the Asia-Europe 
Meeting after the uneasiness about Yangon had been demonstrated during the 
Depayin repression? It seems a paradox, although there were several reasons 
supporting that decision; primarily ASEAN’s determination to build a 
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completely inclusive Southeast Asian community. ASEM was an emanation of 
the Association and was seen as consolidating its existence. Secondly, there 
was ‘the conviction that China’s rise could positively shape East Asia only if 
successful counterbalanced’ and, thirdly, the preoccupation that Myanmar 
could definitely turn to China as an alternative source of support. By 2004 
Myanmar was firmly integrated into regional international society.111   
 
The limited ‘openness’ with regard to Myanmar  
 
As part of the two-pronged approach, the Council also promoted confidence-
building measures aimed at giving strength to the opposition and actors at the 
local level, innovatively seeking to elude the involvement of governmental 
authorities.112 The European limited ‘openness’ on Myanmar had not impeded 
the Council from opposing the prospect of the SPDC taking its turn as chair of 
the ASEAN Standing Committee in 2006-7. The Council re-imposed sanctions 
and also proposed a partial suspension.113 ASEAN members similarly claimed 
that the ‘road map towards democracy’ (originally proposed by the Thai Prime 
Minister in 2003) made no visible progress, and opposed Myanmar’s 
chairmanship. 114  The Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia also 
reacted individually. The SPDC decided to act in the interest of ASEAN, which 
was under external pressure over Myanmar. It employed the justification that 
it wished to focus on the ‘ongoing national reconciliation and democratization 
process,’115 thus placing emphasis on Myanmar’s approach to exercise its own 
sovereign decision and contrast outside interactions, consistently with its 
constitution.116  
 
Departure from non-interference  
 
By now, the ASEAN members had been openly discussing the situation in 
Myanmar among themselves as well as with the European Union and their 
ASEM partners. The SPDC’s non-compliance was barely defended. 117  In 
particular, Thailand’s Foreign Minister (Surin Pitsuwan) encouraged the move 
from the norm of non-interference with internal affairs towards a policy of 
flexible engagement with Myanmar. This called for growing interaction with 
the Burmese leaders, particularly when they took steps towards reform, and 
aimed to build people-to-people bridges.118 This change was largely due to the 
realisation that Myanmar affected ASEAN’s international prestige and so, by 
extension, its integration project. The Association’s member states were now 
focused on transforming their group through the preparation of the ASEAN 
Charter, which was going to establish ASEAN as a legal entity, modelled on 
the European Union.  
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 An analysis of EU behaviour  
 
The consideration that ‘Southeast Asia was set to become one of the most 
dynamic growth areas in the world economy’ and that ‘closer relations were an 
economic imperative’ 119  contributed towards backing a more conciliatory 
policy on Myanmar via EU-ASEAN relations. The EU continued to be 
concerned that interaction with ASEAN with regard to Myanmar should not 
weaken its links with the Association. Also, through both the 2001 and 2003 
Commission’s Communications, the European Union declared its ‘strategic’ 
intentions of raising the EU’s political presence across Southeast Asia to a 
level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU. In 
reality, the EU’s political profile appeared less influential, at least in the terms 
enunciated by the Commission. Yet, some efforts were made to respond to the 
‘key priority’ of further strengthening the long-standing partnership with 
ASEAN. 120  Attempting the suspension of sanctions and compromising on 
Myanmar by opening up a diplomatic representation in Brussels were 
additionally aimed at revitalizing relations with the Association. This novel 
feature characterises the EU-ASEAN relationship with regard to Myanmar. As 
in 1997, when the Council laid emphasis on the welcoming occasion to 
reinforce the dialogue with the Southeast Asian countries via the new 
commitment regarding Myanmar, also in the following years Myanmar 
appears to offer occasions to the EU for re-invigorating its ties to ASEAN.   
 
2007-2012  
 
In 2007, the autumn pro-democracy demonstrations and repression (the 
Suffron uprising) laid bare ASEAN’s impatience with the military junta. 
ASEAN agreed a joint statement with the European Union urging the junta to 
free all political prisoners. In the Council Conclusions of October 2007, the 
EU warned the SPDC that a return to the situation as it was prior to the recent 
demonstrations was both unacceptable and unsustainable. The ASEAN-EU 
statement established no deadlines by which the SPDC must comply. 
Myanmar’s media (The Irrawaddy) argued that the junta’s strong man 
(General Than Shwe) knew ‘how to play in a sophisticated way with a weak 
organisation like ASEAN.’121 By contrast with ASEAN’s alleged low reputation, 
Singapore’s Foreign Minister indicated that ‘ASEAN planned to use its moral 
authority to get all of the political parties in Burma to engage in a genuine 
dialogue.’122 Singapore held ASEAN’s chair and was in a position to seek to 
influence others’ views. Myanmar’s Prime Minister, Thein Sein, argued that 
the Burmese situation was a ‘domestic affair,’ reconfirming the junta’s 
traditional code of conduct. The ASEAN member states also reacted 
individually to the Suffron incidents. Singapore’s senior minister (Goh Chok 
Tong) threatened to cease investment in Myanmar, regarding political reform 
                                                             
119 COM(2003)399.  
120 COM(2001)469.  
121 22 November 2007,  <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Myanmar-playing-“tricks”-with-the-
international-community-10873.html>, accessed October 2013.    
122 G. Yeo, CAN (20 October 2007). 
<http://www.altsean.org/Research/Saffron%20Revolution/SRInternational1.php> 
as a precondition for their mutual economic interaction to continue.123 The 
Philippines’ Senate adopted a resolution urging the EU and ASEAN to end the 
SPDC’s repression of people. 124  The European Union acknowledged the 
changes occurring in ASEAN’s attitudes, and the Association’s efforts to 
influence the Burmese authorities to embrace the transition to democracy,125 
the whole pointing at the novel stance of encouraging Myanmar’s better 
governance. The EU developed a strategy of targeted sanctions combined with 
a policy of a partial trade embargo and limited development cooperation.   
 
The EU’s targeted policy and development cooperation  
 
In the new combined policy, the Council increased its pressure on the SPDC, 
and agreed on measures directed at state-owned industries. It also introduced 
a ban on the creation of joint ventures with blacklisted establishments.126 In 
parallel, the EU confirmed the continuation of the substantial humanitarian 
aid programmes. The European Commission released the Country Strategy 
Paper on Myanmar, in 2007, with an indicative budget of €65 million. It 
resulted from the ‘European Consensus on Development,’ agreed on 20 
December 2005 between the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the EU Council, which identified poverty reduction as the 
main priority of EC development assistance. One of the objectives of the policy 
of dialogue with Myanmar was ‘strengthening civil society’ and intensifying 
‘community participation’ in order to increase local non-state actors’ 
contribution to the development process’ to take place in Myanmar. 127  A 
former EU Special Envoy for Myanmar (2007-2011), interviewed by the 
author, expressed a positive judgement of the projects carried out by the 
Commission in 2007 ‘because they engaged local people in collective 
activities, aiming at building trust and enhancing the interactions among 
communities.’128 The EU also tried to promote negotiations on a EU-ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), in 2007, but these failed to materialise partially 
due to the political instability and related problems in Myanmar.129  
 
ASEAN (and the EU) encouraging better governance  
 
In 2007, ASEAN saw no progress in the SPDC’s governance, no dialogue with 
the political parties; there was no evidence of political reforms or a transition 
to democracy. In Beijing, in 2008, in the ASEM 7 Chair’s statement, ASEAN 
leaders encouraged the ‘government to engage all stakeholders in a inclusive 
political process in order to achieve national reconciliation and economic and 
social development.’ 130  This attitude of trying to convince the SPDC to 
embrace changes was expanded further at the 14th ASEAN’s summit in 
Thailand in 2009. A decisive call for the ‘participation of all political parties’ 
and for ‘free and fair’ general elections in 2010 respectively reinforced 
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ASEAN’s and ASEM’s request for a shift in Myanmar’s conduct of domestic 
affairs.131 ASEAN’s and EU’s demand that the SPDC engage in promoting 
consensus was heightened in reaction to the court verdict passed on Suu Kyi, 
in August 2009, which added 18 months to her house arrest. The ASEM 
partners prompted Myanmar’s authorities to step ‘towards a legitimate, 
constitutional and civilian system of government.’132 The ASEAN argument 
that the elections must convince the international community that they were 
transparently prepared was a further reminder issued in late 2009.133 The 
European Union recommenced boosting its targeted policy in response to the 
court’s verdict on Suu Kyi, with sanctions this time focused on the members of 
the judiciary responsible for the decision.134 It also recognised the progress 
promised by the ‘promulgation of a new electoral law.’135  
 
Yet, faulty party registrations, defective laws and the boycott of the NLD 
regarding the November 2010 elections were the specific focus of the meeting 
of ASEM Foreign Ministers held in Hungary in 2011. The EU policy re-
extended the sanctions136 and updated the list of persons and entities subject 
to restrictive procedures, in line with its focused strategy. It made clear to the 
Myanmar junta that the ‘non-association’ of the government’s appointees with 
the military was vital to the dialogue with the international community. 
Aiming at encouraging ‘progress in civilian governance,’ the EU lifted the 
suspension of high-level bilateral governmental visits to Myanmar for a period 
of twelve months, and freed from these restrictions the new members of the 
government who were unaffiliated with the military. The reforms initiated by 
Thein Sein in his new role of President since March 2011 and the subsequent 
April 2012 by-elections showed Myanmar’s willingness for change to be put 
into practice. The transformations were publicly recognized by ASEAN and 
the European Union, which invited European companies to explore new 
opportunities for trade and investment and to promote the highest standards 
of integrity and Corporate Social Responsibility. 137  The European Union 
solicited further compliance and renewed, and also lifted, certain restrictive 
measures. 138  Myanmar’s authorities’ signing on 20 September 2013, in 
Brussels, of the Additional Protocol on the application of safeguards in 
connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a 
further sign of a partnership in the making between the EU and Myanmar. 
 
Assessing EU behaviour 
 
EU behaviour vis-à-vis Myanmar since the Suffron uprising evolved. EU 
ministers declared themselves ready to discuss Burmese matters with their 
Myanmar counterparts at several possible meetings, including regional, 
ministerial ASEAN-EU, ASEM, or at bilateral gatherings at the margins of 
these. The EU delivered the Strategy Paper on Myanmar regarding 2007-
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2013.139 Both the aired meetings and the strategy paper hinged on ASEAN. 
ASEAN was also key to the subsequent EU’s policy-making on Myanmar, 
namely the 2013 Comprehensive Framework. In that document, the EU 
pledged to assist Myanmar’s government with rebuilding its place in the 
international community, and also promised to support it in reaping the 
benefits of integration within ASEAN. 140  Again, it appears that Myanmar 
helped to reinforce the long-lasting EU-ASEAN relationship rather than 
endangering the EU’s ties with ASEAN.  
 
Conclusions  
 
EU behaviour vis-à-vis Myanmar via EU-ASEAN has displayed an element of 
continuity; the EU has constantly demonstrated concern to avoid the 
Myanmar issue destabilising its relations with ASEAN. As the interviewees 
confirmed, it was clear that the desire to get away from influential China, 
together with the appeal for new partners were crucial in bringing about the 
changes. These have been identified as falling into three different phases. 
First, the EU insisted on sanctioning Myanmar, and ASEAN on rejecting the 
censure of Yangon’s regime by its EU dialogue partner. This dynamics was 
well-established during 1991-1997. The EU’s obstinacy in applying negative 
measures corresponded to ASEAN’s inflexibility in defending its opposition to 
the ‘external interference’ of the EU and to its good governance claim. Second, 
the EU moderated criticism of Myanmar and ASEAN distanced itself from 
rejecting the censure of the regime by its EU dialogue partner. These changes 
occurred during 1998-2006. The Council of the European Union tried to use 
the two-pronged strategy of suspension and renewal of sanctions, and ASEAN 
demonstrated a change by starting to discuss Myanmar’s problems during its 
meetings with the EU, expressly making recommendations, and progressively 
relaxing the non-interference principle. The article upheld that the latter 
change was backed by the Association’s preoccupation with the fact that 
Myanmar’s affairs might negatively impact on ASEAN’s integration project 
and standing. Third, the EU employed targeted sanctions and limited 
development cooperation, while ASEAN encouraged Myanmar’s better 
governance. These policies evolved during 2007-2012. The Commission’s 
Country Strategy Paper on Myanmar proved that the EU was less obstinate 
and intractable in its position of merely continuously sanctioning Myanmar. It 
showed some openness in promoting local (non-state) actors’ contribution to 
the democratisation process as an interviewee has stated. ASEAN, 
concomitantly, several times insisted to the military junta that a transition to 
democracy was expected by the Association.  
 
Informed by the idea of the evolution of the EU profile in world affairs 
through its political connections with ASEAN, this article illuminates the 
Commission’s ‘attention to the EU’s perceived growing global weight’ and call 
‘to raise its profile’ across Southeast Asia. However the evidence leads to the 
conclusion that the EU has not been punching to its weight in the region.141  
 
                                                             
139 The EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013), op. cit.  
140 Council conclusions, 22 July 2013, p. 2.  
141 See also Cameron, op cit., pp. 41-2.  
Investigations on Asian perceptions of the EU agree that the European Union 
is a global political actor ‘somewhere else’ in the world.142 With regard to 
Myanmar, as the Burmese interviewees indicated, the EU was an ‘unknown’ 
actor, or an agent which attracted a sort of negative publicity. However, 
through the latest partnership strategy, the EU is finding new ways to raise its 
visibility as a motivating and inspiring referee. While many scholars have 
dwelled on the difficulties caused by the Myanmar issue to the EU-ASEAN 
ties, this investigation has demonstrated the extent to which the Myanmar 
case has in fact helped to reinforce the long-lasting EU-ASEAN relationship 
Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli is a political scientist. Her main 
research interest is in the EU’s External Relations and her publications have 
appeared in journals such as European Security, Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society, Modern Italy, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research and European Journal of International Affairs. She is the author of 
the book ‘Italy and EPC’ and of the edited volume ‘An EU Innovative External 
Action’ (Cambridge Scholars Publishing). Her current research is on strategic 
culture and South European countries. 
                                                             
142 See M. Holland, et al (eds) The EU through the Eyes of Asia, Warsaw, University of Warsaw, 2007.    
